Medical examiners, coroners, and biologic terrorism: a guidebook for surveillance and case management by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
Recommendations and Reports June 11, 2004 / Vol. 53 / No. RR-8
INSIDE: Continuing Education Examination
department of health and human services
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Biologic Terrorism
A Guidebook for Surveillance and Case Management
Yale University, Harvey Cushing/John
Hay Whitney Medical Library
MMWR
CONTENTS
Introduction......................................................................... 1
Background ......................................................................... 2
Medicolegal Death Investigators ....................................... 2
Biologic Terrorism ............................................................. 3
Probable Biologic Terrorism Agents, Diseases,
and Diagnostic Tests .......................................................... 4
Agent Categories .............................................................. 4
Diagnostic Tests ................................................................ 4
Anthrax ............................................................................ 5
Plague .............................................................................. 7
Tularemia ......................................................................... 8
Botulism ........................................................................... 9
Smallpox ........................................................................ 10
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers ............................................... 11
Laboratory Response Network ........................................... 12
Biosafety Concerns ............................................................ 13
Autopsy Risks .................................................................. 13
Autopsy Precautions ....................................................... 14
ME/C’s Role in Biologic Terrorism Surveillance .................. 17
ME/C’s Role in Data Collection, Analysis,
and Dissemination ........................................................... 19
Jurisdictional, Evidentiary, and Operational Concerns ....... 19
Federal Role ................................................................... 19
Public Health Agency Authority ....................................... 20
General Operations ........................................................ 20
Postmortem Examinations and Evidence Collection ......... 20
Cause and Manner of Death Statements ........................ 21
Reimbursement for Expenses and Potential Funding
Sources ............................................................................ 21
DMORT ............................................................................. 22
DMORT-WMD Team ........................................................ 23
Communications and the Incident Command System ........ 23
Conclusion ........................................................................ 24
Acknowledgments ............................................................. 25
References......................................................................... 25
SUGGESTED CITATION
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Medical
examiners, coroners, and biologic terrorism: a
guidebook for surveillance and case management.
MMWR 2004;53(No. RR-8):[inclusive page
numbers].
The MMWR series of publications is published by the
Epidemiology Program Office, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Atlanta, GA 30333.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Julie L. Gerberding, M.D., M.P.H.
Director
Dixie E. Snider, Jr., M.D., M.P.H.
 (Acting) Deputy Director for Public Health Science
Tanja Popovic, M.D., Ph.D.
(Acting) Associate Director for Science
Epidemiology Program Office
Stephen B. Thacker, M.D., M.Sc.
Director
Office of Scientific and Health Communications
John W. Ward, M.D.
Director
Editor, MMWR Series
Suzanne M. Hewitt, M.P.A.
Managing Editor, MMWR Series
C. Kay Smith-Akin, M.Ed.
Lead Technical Writer/Editor
Project Editor
Beverly J. Holland
Lead Visual Information Specialist
Lynda G. Cupell
Malbea A. Heilman
Visual Information Specialists
Kim L. Bright, M.B.A.
Quang M. Doan, M.B.A.
Erica R. Shaver
Information Technology Specialists
On the Cover: Historic woodcut of the dissection of a
human corpse, Anonymous in Johannes de Ketham,
Fasciculus Medicinae (1493). Reprinted courtesy of Yale
University School of Medicine.
Disclosure of Relationship
CDC, our planners, and our content professionals have disclosed
that they have no financial interests or other relationships with the
manufactures of commercial products, suppliers of commercial
services, or commercial supporters. This report does not include
any discussion of the unlabeled use of a product or a product under
investigational use.
Vol. 53 / RR-8 Recommendations and Reports 1
The material in this report originated in the Epidemiology Program
Office, Stephen B. Thacker, M.D., M.Sc., Director; the Division of
Public Health Surveillance and Informatics, Richard Hopkins, M.D.,
M.S.P.H., Acting Director; the National Center for Infectious Diseases,
James M. Hughes, M.D., Director; and the Division of Viral and
Rickettsial Diseases, James LeDuc, Ph.D., Sc.D., Director.
Introduction
Terrorist events in recent years have heightened awareness
of the risk of terrorist acts involving unconventional agents,
including biologic and chemical weapons. The need for ter-
rorism preparedness and planning for response at multiple
levels is now recognized, including planning and response by
medical examiners, coroners (ME/Cs), and the medicolegal
death-investigation system.
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Summary
Medical examiners and coroners (ME/Cs) are essential public health partners for terrorism preparedness and response. These
medicolegal investigators support both public health and public safety functions and investigate deaths that are sudden, suspi-
cious, violent, unattended, and unexplained. Medicolegal autopsies are essential for making organism-specific diagnoses in deaths
caused by biologic terrorism. This report has been created to 1) help public health officials understand the role of ME/Cs in
biologic terrorism surveillance and response efforts and 2) provide ME/Cs with the detailed information required to build
capacity for biologic terrorism preparedness in a public health context. This report provides background information regarding
biologic terrorism, possible biologic agents, and the consequent clinicopathologic diseases, autopsy procedures, and diagnostic tests
as well as a description of biosafety risks and standards for autopsy precautions. ME/Cs’ vital role in terrorism surveillance requires
consistent standards for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data. Familiarity with the operational, jurisdictional, and
evidentiary concerns involving biologic terrorism-related death investigation is critical to both ME/Cs and public health authori-
ties. Managing terrorism-associated fatalities can be expensive and can overwhelm the existing capacity of ME/Cs. This report
describes federal resources for funding and reimbursement for ME/C preparedness and response activities and the limited support
capacity of the federal Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team. Standards for communication are critical in responding to
any emergency situation. This report, which is a joint collaboration between CDC and the National Association of Medical
Examiners (NAME), describes the relationship between ME/Cs and public health departments, emergency management agencies,
emergency operations centers, and the Incident Command System.
Federal, state, and local agencies have developed plans to
detect and respond to terrorism by using a multidisciplinary
approach that requires active participation of health-care
providers, law enforcement, and public health and safety staff.
Because ME/Cs have expertise in disease surveillance, diag-
nosis, deceased body handling, and evidence collection, they
serve a vital role in terrorism preparedness and response.
ME/Cs should ensure that their role in surveillance for
unusual deaths — and response to known terrorist events —
is a critical part of the multidisciplinary response team. Ter-
rorism-related drills and practical exercises conducted by public
health, law enforcement, and public safety agencies should
include training on postmortem operations and services.
This report, prepared as a joint effort between the National
Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) and CDC, is a
first step in providing specific guidance to ME/C death inves-
tigators and public health officials. This report can help bridge
gaps that exist in local terrorism preparedness and response
planning. By discussing the substantial contributions of
* Member of the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME).
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ME/Cs, this report can also serve as a foundation for identify-
ing the needs of medicolegal death-investigation systems and
for addressing those needs through adequate training and
funding.
This report provides guidance, identifies support services
and resources, and discusses the roles and responsibilities of
ME/Cs and affiliated personnel in recognizing and respond-
ing to potential biologic terrorism events. Certain questions
being asked by ME/Cs and their public health partners are
answered in this report, including the following:
• What are the likely biologic agents to be encountered?
• What are the expected case fatality rates and time courses
for the different agents?
• What types of ongoing surveillance are needed to detect
potential biologic terrorism-associated incidents?
• What protective equipment and procedures are needed
to ensure the safety of death investigation and forensic
pathology personnel?
• What are the appropriate facilities in which to perform
postmortem examinations in cases of suspected biologic
terrorism?
• What are the best methods for ensuring biosafety during
the mortuary process?
• How will hospitals, emergency personnel, health depart-
ments, and ME/Cs effectively communicate during a
suspected or known incident?
• How will local ME/C systems
interact with the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) and
other investigative agencies?
• What is the minimum extent
of examination that will be re-
quired? For example, will a
complete autopsy be required
in every suspected case to
support the criminal justice
process?
• What pathology-specific tests
are available; which ones are
the best to use to make an
accurate diagnosis; and which
ones are the best for making a
rapid diagnosis?
• Which laboratories are best
suited to perform the necessary
postmortem testing?
• What role does public health
law play in determining dispo-
sition of bodies?
• What legal authority do public health agencies have in
making decisions during potential biologic terrorism
events?
• What federal resources are available to assist ME/Cs?
Background
Medicolegal Death Investigators
CDC has identified medicolegal death investigators (i.e.,
ME/Cs) as essential partners in terrorism preparedness and
response (1). This report is designed to assist ME/Cs and their
public health partners in developing appropriate capacity for
recognizing and responding to deaths that are potentially a
consequence of biologic terrorism.
The organization of medicolegal death investigative systems
within the United States varies by state (2). As ME/Cs and
public health and public safety departments prepare to
respond to terrorism-associated events, each state should con-
sider how its medicolegal death investigation system is orga-
nized. These systems can be medical examiner-based (21 states
and the District of Columbia), coroner-based (10 states), or
both (19 states) (Figure 1). Typically, coroners are elected lay
persons who use medical personnel to assist in death investi-
gation and autopsy performance. Medical examiners are
FIGURE 1. U.S. death investigation systems by state, 2001
DC
Coroner-based
Medical examiner-based
Combination medical examiner-
and coronor-based
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usually appointed physicians and pathologists who have
received special training in death investigation and forensic
pathology.
Medicolegal death investigation systems can be either cen-
tralized (i.e., investigations emanate from one state-level office)
or decentralized (i.e., investigations are conducted in more
than one regional-, county-, or city-based office). A total of
23 states plus the District of Columbia have centralized sys-
tems; 27 states are decentralized. States with medical exam-
iner systems might have a state-based medical examiner office,
and also have county-level autonomous medical examiner
offices that perform their own autopsies and manage their
own data and administrative systems.
ME/C offices can also vary in their organizational position
within the government. ME/C offices might be a component
of the public health department or the public safety depart-
ment, or be independent of other government agencies. All
types of medicolegal death investigation systems should be
considered when determining the roles, responsibilities, and
participation of ME/Cs in a jurisdiction’s terrorism prepared-
ness and response plans.
Biologic Terrorism
Biologic terrorism is defined as “the use or threatened use of
biologic agents against a person, group, or larger population
to create fear or illnesses for purposes of intimidation, gaining
an advantage, interruption of normal activities, or ideologic
activities. The resultant reaction is dependent upon the actual
event and the population involved and can vary from a mini-
mal effect to disruption of ongoing activities and emotional
reaction, illness, or death” (3). In the United States in 1984,
an outbreak of terrorism-related Salmonella dysentery caused
715 persons to become ill, but no fatalities resulted (4). In
2001, the intentional distribution of anthrax spores through
the U.S. Postal Service resulted in five deaths from inhala-
tional anthrax (5–8). MEs were critical members of the
response team during the anthrax outbreak, performing
autopsies on each fatality to confirm the cause of death as
anthrax and to identify the manner of death as homicide.
ME/Cs have state statutory authority to investigate deaths
that are sudden, suspicious, violent, unattended, or unex-
plained (9); therefore, these investigators have a role in recog-
nizing and reporting fatal outbreaks, including those that are
possibly terrorism-related, and a role in responding to a known
terrorist event (10–12). Deaths of persons at home or away
from health-care facilities fall under the jurisdiction and sur-
veillance of medicolegal death investigators (13), who often
identify infectious diseases that are not terrorism-related. For
example, in 1993, MEs recognized an outbreak of hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome, a disease with symptoms that can mimic
terrorism-related illnesses (14). Deaths of patients in hospi-
tals can also fall under medicolegal jurisdiction if the patient
dies precipitously before an accurate diagnosis is made or if a
public health concern exists (10). Fatalities caused by known
terrorist events are homicides and therefore fall under the statu-
tory jurisdiction of ME/Cs.
Risk assessment for potential biologic terrorism is an
uncertain process. Hypothetical terrorism scenarios can
involve a limited number of cases or millions of cases, with
proportionate numbers of fatalities. For example, in 2002,
the Dark Winter smallpox exercise included in the scenario
3 million fourth-generation cases of smallpox and approxi-
mately 1 million deaths (15). In 2000, the TOPOFF (Top
Officials) plague exercise included in the scenario 2,000
fatalities in a 1-week period (16). Given such possibilities if a
biologic terrorist event occurred, ME/Cs should proactively
identify appropriate resources and links to the public health,
emergency response, health-care, and law enforcement com-
munities. With appropriate resources and links, ME/Cs can
assist with surveillance for infectious disease deaths possibly
caused by terrorism and provide confirmatory diagnoses and
evidence in deaths clearly linked to terrorism. Conversely,
public health agencies should recognize ME/Cs as a vital part
of the public health system and keep them informed of infec-
tious disease outbreaks occurring in their jurisdictions so that
they are better able to recognize related fatalities. Addition-
ally, public health agencies should provide ME/Cs with
appropriate resources to enhance their surveillance and
response capacities for terrorism.
An ME/C’s principal diagnostic tool is the autopsy. This
procedure enables pathologists to identify the dead, observe
the condition of the body, and reach conclusions regarding
the cause and manner of death. Autopsies are valuable in
diagnosing unrecognized infections, evaluating therapy,
understanding the pathogenesis and route of infection for
uncommon or emerging infections, and developing evidence
for subsequent legal proceedings (10,17). In 1979, an anthrax
outbreak occurred that was associated with an unintentional
release of spores from a bioweapons factory in the Soviet city
of Sverdlovsk; pathologists used autopsies to identify the cause
of death as anthrax and the route of infection as inhalation
(18). In a 1945 smallpox outbreak, autopsy pathologists, rather
than clinicians, were the physicians who recognized the
sentinel case (19).
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BOX 1. Classification of biologic terrorism agents
Category A Agents
• Variola major (smallpox)
• Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
• Yersinia pestis (plague)
• Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism)
• Francisella tularensis (tularemia)
• Hemorrhagic fever viruses, including
— Filoviruses including Ebola and Marburg hemor-
rhagic fever
— Arenaviruses, including Lassa (Lassa fever) and Junin
(Argentine hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses
Category B Agents
• Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
• Brucella species (brucellosis)
• Burkholderia mallei (glanders)
• Alphaviruses including Venezuelan encephalomyelitis
and eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis viruses
• Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)
• Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
• Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
• Food- and waterborne pathogens
— Salmonella species
— Shigella dysenteriae
— Escherichia coli O157:H7
— Vibrio cholerae
— Cryptosporidium parvum
Category C Agents
• Nipah virus
• Hantaviruses
• Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses
• Tickborne encephalitis viruses
• Yellow fever virus
• Multidrug-resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis
† Additional information is available by contacting CDC by telephone (404-
639-3133) or by fax (404-639-3043).
Probable Biologic Terrorism Agents,
Diseases, and Diagnostic Tests
Agent Categories
In this report, the list of potential biologic terrorism agents
has been prioritized on the basis of the risk to national
security (Box 1) (1). Biologic agents are classified as high-risk,
or Category A, because they can 1) be easily disseminated or
transmitted person to person; 2) cause high mortality, with
potential for major public health impact; 3) might cause pub-
lic panic and social disruption; or 4) require special action for
public health preparedness. The second highest priority, or
Category B, agents include those that 1) are moderately easy
to disseminate; 2) cause moderate morbidity and low mortality;
or 3) require enhanced disease surveillance. The third highest
priority, or Category C, agents include emerging pathogens
that can be engineered for future mass dissemination because
of 1) availability; 2) ease of production and dissemination; or
3) potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health
impact.
Recognizing pathologic features of different biologic agents
is important, as demonstrated by the inhalational and cuta-
neous anthrax cases that occurred in the United States during
2001 (5,8,20–23). The autopsy of the index patient was
performed to determine how the person had acquired anthrax
(cutaneous, gastrointestinal, or inhalational). After inhalational
anthrax was diagnosed, public health officials were able to
better define potential sources of the airborne Bacillus anthracis
spores.
Diagnostic Tests
If possible, given the constraints of case volume and biosafety
concerns, complete autopsies with histologic sampling of
multiple organs should be performed in deaths potentially
caused by infections with biologic terrorism agents. Autopsy
diagnostic procedures for the Category A agents include
microscopic examination, combined with the collection of
specimens for additional tests that will aid in determining a
definitive organism-specific diagnosis. Blood, cerebrospinal
fluid, and tissue samples or swabs should be placed in trans-
port media that will allow bacterial and viral isolation. Serum
should be collected for serologic and biologic assays. Tissue
samples should be frozen for polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
Tissue samples should also be placed in electron microscopy
fixative (glutaraldehyde). Microscopic examination of forma-
lin-fixed, paraffin-embedded tissues stained with hematoxy-
lin and eosin (H&E) is essential to characterizing the patterns
of tissue damage defining a syndrome and establishes a list of
possible microorganisms in the differential diagnosis. To
enhance surveillance for these conditions, a matrix of poten-
tial pathology-based syndromes (Table 1) has been developed
to guide autopsy pathologists in recognizing potential cases
(24). Special stains (e.g., tissue Gram and silver impregnation
stains [Steiner’s or Warthin-Starry]), can be helpful in identi-
fying bacterial agents. Additionally, specific immunohis-
tochemical (IHC) and direct fluorescent assays (DFA) for the
Category A terrorism agents have been developed and are avail-
able at CDC.† These tests can be performed on formalin-fixed
tissues. Clinical and pathologic characteristics of the Category
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TABLE 1. Matrix of autopsy pathologic syndromes and potential terrorism-related illnesses* or agents
Illness or agent Autopsy pathologic syndrome
Plague, tularemia, Q fever, inhaled staphylococcal enterotoxin B, ricin Community-acquired pneumonia; diffuse alveolar damage (ARDS)
Smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers, T-2 mycotoxins Diffuse rash
Plague, tularemia, anthrax, viral hemorrhagic fevers, T-2 mycotoxins Sepsis syndromes (i.e., disseminated intravascular coagulopathy [DIC])
Anthrax Hemorrhagic mediastinitis or meningitis
Brucellosis, viral hemorrhagic fevers Hepatitis, fulminant hepatic necrosis
Venezuelan equine encephalitis and other equine encephalomyelitis agents Encephalitis, meningitis
Viral hemorrhagic fever (Lassa) Pharyngitis, epiglottitis and other upper airway infections
Cutaneous anthrax, bubonic plague, tularemia Soft tissue infections — cellulitis, abscess, necrotizing fasciitis
Escherichia coli and Shigella colitis, gastrointestinal anthrax Hemorrhagic colitis
* Adapted from Med-X, New Mexico Surveillance Program.
system, producing hemorrhagic meningitis (i.e., cardinal’s cap)
(Figure 5).
Diagnostic Specimens. Performing a complete autopsy with
histologic sampling of multiple organs will help determine
the distribution of bacilli and the portal of entry. The speci-
mens that harbor the highest number of B.
anthracis organisms vary by the pathologic
form of anthrax. For example, diagnosis of
cutaneous anthrax requires skin samples from
the center and periphery of the eschar, whereas
for inhalational anthrax, pleural fluid cell
blocks, pleura tissue, and mediastinal lymph
nodes have the highest amounts of bacilli
and antigens.
Diagnostic Tests. If the patient has not
received antibiotics, bacilli can be observed
in tissues with H&E, Gram, and silver im-
pregnation stains and IHC assays (Figures 6
and 7). However, after antibiotic treatment
A agents and corresponding diagnostic methods are summa-
rized in this report (Tables 2 and 3).
Anthrax
Agent: Bacillus anthracis
Pathologic Findings. Anthrax has three pathologic forms.
Cutaneous anthrax is characterized by an eschar that forms
where the bacteria entered the skin (Figure 2). Microscopi-
cally, the epidermis has necrosis and crusts, whereas the
dermis demonstrates necrosis, edema, hemorrhage, perivas-
cular inflammation, and vasculitis. The lymph nodes that drain
the skin site eventually become enlarged, necrotic, and hem-
orrhagic. Gastrointestinal anthrax is distinguishable by hem-
orrhagic ulcers in the terminal ileum and caecum accompanied
by mesenteric hemorrhagic lymphadenitis and peritonitis.
Inhalational anthrax is characterized by hemorrhagic medias-
tinal lymphadenitis (Figure 3) accompanied by pleural effu-
sions. Histologically, lymph nodes have abundant edema,
hemorrhage, and necrosis with limited inflammatory infiltrate
(Figure 4) (18,25–29). As any of the three anthrax forms
progresses, the bacteria can spread to abdominal organs,
producing petechial hemorrhages, and to the central nervous
TABLE 2. Selected epidemiologic characteristics of illnesses caused by Category A
biologic agents*
Incubation Durationof
Disease period illness Case fatality rates
Inhalational anthrax 1–6 days 3–5 days Untreated, 100%
Treated, 45%
Botulism 6 hr–10 days 24–72 hrs Outbreak-associated, first patient, 25%
Subsequent patients, 4%
Overall, 5%–10%
Tularemia 1–21 days 2 weeks Untreated, 33%
Treated, <4%
Pneumonic plague 2–3 days 1–6 days Untreated, 40%–70%
Treated, 5%
Smallpox 7–17 days 4 weeks Overall, 20%–50%
Viral hemorrhagic fevers 4–21 days 7–16 days Overall, 53%–88%
* Source: CDC. Bioterrorism : agent summary. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human
Services, CDC, 2001.
FIGURE 2. Cutaneous anthrax — eschar lesion
Public Health Image Library, CDC
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Smallpox virus (variola major)
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
Yersinia pestis (plague)
Francisella tularensis (tularemia)
Viral hemorrhagic fevers
Multiloculated vesicles, ballooning degeneration of
epithelial cells, intracytoplasmic inclusions (Guarnieri
bodies)
Inhalational anthrax — hemorrhagic mediastinitis,
hemorrhagic lymphadenitis, hemorrhagic pleural
effusion
Cutaneous anthrax — hemorrhage, edema,
necrosis, perivascular infiltrate, vasculitis
Gastrointestinal anthrax — hemorrhagic enteritis,
hemorrhagic lymphadenitis, mucosal ulcers with
necrosis in the terminal ileum and cecum, peritonitis
CNS involvement — hemorrhagic meningitis
Bubonic plague — acute lymphadenitis with
surrounding edema
Pneumonic plague — severe, confluent, hemorrhagic,
and necrotizing bronchopneumonia, often with
fibrinous pleuritis
Septicemic plague — generalized lymphadenitis, foci
of necrosis in lymph nodes and other reticuloendot-
helial organs, disseminated intravascular coagulation
(DIC) with widespread hemorrhages and thrombi
CNS involvement — meningitis
Ulceroglandular tularemia — skin ulcer with
associated suppurative necrotizing lymphadenitis
Glandular tularemia — suppurative necrotizing
lymphadenitis without associated skin ulcer
Oculoglandular tularemia — eyelid edema, acute
conjunctivitis and edema, small conjunctival ulcers,
regional lymphadenitis
Pharyngeal tularemia — exudative pharyngitis or
tonsillitis with ulceration, pharyngeal membrane
formation, regional lymphadenitis
Typhoidal tularemia — systemic involvement, DIC,
focal necrosis of major organs
Pneumonic tularemia — acute inflammation, diffuse
alveolar damage
Filoviruses (Ebola and Marburg) — massive
hepatocellular necrosis, filamentous inclusions in
hepatocytes, extensive necrosis in other major
organs, diffuse alveolar damage
Arenaviruses (Lassa, Junin, Machupo, Guanarito) —
massive hepatic necrosis, diffuse alveolar damage
Chicken pox, monkeypox, parapox, tanapox, herpes
simplex, secondary syphilis
Inhalational anthrax — community acquired
pneumonia, pneumonic tularemia or plague,
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, bacterial/fungal/
tuberculous mediastinitis or meningitis, fulminate
mediastinal tumors, aortic dissection
Cutaneous anthrax — rickettsialpox, spider bite,
ecthyma gangrenosum, ulceroglandular tularemia
Bubonic  plague — tularemia, other bacterial adenitis
Pneumonic plague — inhalational anthrax, commu-
nity acquired pneumonia, pneumonic tularemia,
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
Septicemic plague — other bacterial sepsis
Plague meningitis — other bacterial or fungal
meningitis
Ulceroglandular tularemia — cutaneous anthrax,
rickettsialpox, spider bite, ecthyma gangrenosum
Glandular tularemia — pyogenic bacterial infections,
cat-scratch disease, syphilis, chancroid, lym-
phogranuloma venereum, tuberculosis,
nontuberculous mycobacterial infection, toxoplasmo-
sis, sporotrichosis, rat-bite fever, anthrax, plague
Oculoglandular tularemia — pyogenic bacterial
infections, adenoviral infection, syphilis, cat-scratch
disease, herpes simplex virus infection
Pharyngeal tularemia — streptococcal pharyngitis,
infectious mononucleosis, adenoviral infection,
diphtheria
Typhoidal tularemia — typhoid fever, brucellosis, Q
fever, disseminated bacterial, mycobacterial or
fungal infection, rickettsioses, malaria
Pneumonic tularemia — community-acquired
pneumonia, pneumonic plague, hantavirus pulmo-
nary syndrome
Other systemic infections caused by viral, bacterial,
or rickettsial agents
TABLE 3. Primary pathologic features and differential diagnoses of illnesses caused by Category A biologic agents
Agent/disease Primary pathologic features Differential diagnosis
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has been instituted, only silver stains and IHC assays will high-
light the bacilli. IHC assays for B. anthracis can demonstrate
bacilli, bacillary fragments, and granular bacterial fragments
in formalin-fixed tissues, even after 10 days of antibiotic treat-
ment. Although a DFA test is available for B. anthracis, it is
not used on formalin-fixed tissues.
Plague
Agent: Yersinia pestis
Pathologic Findings. Similar to anthrax, the clinicopatho-
logic manifestations of plague are classified on the basis of the
portal of entry of Y. pestis. Bubonic plague refers to an acute
lymphadenitis that occurs after the bacteria have penetrated
the skin (Figure 8). Usually, skin lesions are inconspicuous or
have a small vesicle or pustule that might not be evident at the
time the infected lymph node (bubo) appears. Histologically,
the bubo exhibits edema, hemorrhage, necrosis, and a ground-
glass amphophilic material that represents masses of bacilli.
Primary pneumonic plague refers to the infection caused by
inhalation of airborne bacteria, producing intra-alveolar edema
accompanied by varying amounts of acute inflammatory
infiltrate and abundant bacteria. Primary septicemic plague
occurs when Y. pestis enters through the oropharyngeal route.
In septicemic plague, the cervical lymph nodes draining the
infected region will display the previously described patho-
logic features. As the disease progresses, bacteria are distrib-
uted widely throughout the body, and findings consistent with
shock and disseminated intravascular coagulation are observed.
FIGURE 3. Inhalational anthrax — hemorrhagic mediastinal
lymphadenitis surrounding trachea; inset, cross-section of
trachea surrounded by hemorrhagic soft tissue and lymph
nodes
Reprinted courtesy of New York City Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner
FIGURE 4. Inhalational anthrax — histologic section of
mediastinal lymph node with hemorrhage, necrosis, and
sparse inflammatory cell infiltrate (hematoxylin and eosin
stain)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
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Septicemic plague with bacterial seeding of the lungs results
in secondary pneumonic plague (Figure 9, left [A]) (30–35).
Diagnostic Specimens. Performing a complete autopsy with
histologic sampling of multiple organs will help determine
the distribution of bacteria and the portal of entry. Enlarged,
soft, hemorrhagic lymph nodes should be sampled and tested
for Y. pestis. The lungs should be sampled to determine whether
a primary or secondary infection existed (30).
Diagnostic Tests. Y. pestis can be visualized in formalin-
fixed tissues by using H&E, Gram, silver impregnation, and
Giemsa stains; however, specific identification of the bacilli in
tissues can only be performed by using IHC or DFA (Figure 9,
right [B]).
Tularemia
Agent: Francisella tularensis
Pathologic Findings. Tularemia can also have multiple clini-
copathologic forms, depending on the portal of entry, includ-
ing ulceroglandular, oculoglandular, glandular, pharyngeal,
typhoidal, and pneumonic. In all forms, the primary draining
lymph nodes demonstrate necrotizing lymphadenitis sur-
rounded by a neutrophilic and granulomatous inflammatory
infiltrate. In the ulceroglandular form, a skin ulcer or eschar
with corresponding lymph node involvement is present, but
skin lesions are absent in the glandular form. In the
oculoglandular form, the eye exhibits conjunctivitis with
ulcers and soft-tissue edema. The pharyngeal form is charac-
terized by pharyngitis or tonsillitis with ulceration. The lungs
in pneumonic tularemia exhibit abundant fibrinous necrosis
accompanied by varying amounts of mixed inflammatory
infiltrate (Figure 10, left [A]). Typhoidal tularemia refers to
systemic involvement with focal areas of necrosis in the major
organs and disseminated intravascular coagulation, but lacks
a group of primary draining lymph nodes (36–40). In cases
of tularemia sepsis, organisms can be seen with blood smears
(Figure 11).
Diagnostic Specimens. Performing a complete autopsy with
histologic sampling of multiple organs will help determine
the distribution of bacteria and the portal of entry. Enlarged,
necrotic lymph nodes should be sampled and tested for
F. tularensis. Culture swabs from the potential portals of entry
(e.g., skin, conjunctiva, or throat) can be useful.
FIGURE 5. Anthrax — hemorrhagic meningitis
Public Health Image Library, CDC
FIGURE 6. Anthrax — Bacillus anthracis rods in mediastinal
lymph node (Gram stain)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
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Diagnostic Tests. The microorganisms are difficult to dem-
onstrate with special stains; however, IHC and DFA have been
successfully used in formalin-fixed tissues to demonstrate the
bacteria (Figure 10, right [B]).
Botulism
Agent: Absorption of Clostridium botulinum
Toxin
Pathologic Findings. C. botulinum elaborates a potent, pre-
formed neurotoxin. The most important diagnostic feature of
botulism is the clinical history because the histopathologic
changes are nonspecific (e.g., central nervous system hyper-
emia and microthrombosis of small vessels) (41).
FIGURE 7. Anthrax — Bacillus anthracis rods, bacillary
fragments and granular bacterial fragments in spleen
(immunohistochemistry)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
FIGURE 8. Bubonic plague — lymphadenitis
New Mexico Office of the Medical Investigator
FIGURE 9. Secondary pneumonic plague — histologic
sections of lung with (A, left) neutrophilic infiltrate in alveolar
space (hematoxylin and eosin stain) and (B, right) Yersinia
pestis bacteria (immunohistochemistry)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
10 MMWR June 11, 2004
intranuclear viral changes. Secondary infections (e.g., bron-
chitis, pneumonia, and encephalitis) can complicate the clinical
appearance (43–48).
Diagnostic Specimens. Cutaneous lesions are the most
important sample for smallpox. Samples should include fluid
from vesicles to be studied by electron microscopy, and skin
samples fixed in formalin for histopathology and immuno-
histochemistry. Performing a complete autopsy with histo-
logic sampling of multiple organs will help determine the
extent and distribution of the virus, as well as the occurrence
of secondary infections.
Diagnostic Tests. Electron microscopic studies of vesicle
fluid or skin samples can identify characteristic viral particles
(Figure 14). IHC studies have demonstrated the virus in the
epithelial cells and in the subjacent fibroconnective tissue.
Diagnostic Specimens. When botulism is suspected
because of a symmetrical, descending pattern of weakness and
paralysis of cranial nerves, limbs, and trunk, the pathologist
should obtain tissue for anaerobic cultures from the suspect
entry sites (i.e., wound, gastrointestinal tract, or respiratory
tract) and serum for botulinum toxin mouse bioassay.
Diagnostic Tests. Microbiologic culture and botulinum
toxin mouse bioassay with serum are necessary.
Smallpox
Agent: Variola virus (Orthopoxvirus)
Pathologic Findings. Smallpox is an acute, highly conta-
gious illness caused by a member of the Poxviridae family.
Variola major refers to the form with a higher mortality rate,
and variola minor or alastrim is a milder form. The lesions
develop at approximately the same time and rate, starting in
the palms and soles and spreading centrally; they first appear
as macules and papules, and then progress to vesicles and
umbilicated pustules (Figure 12), followed by scabs and crusts,
and end as pitted scars. Occasionally, a hemorrhagic and uni-
formly fatal form occurs. This form has extensive bleeding
into the skin and gastrointestinal tract and can be grossly taken
for meningococcemia, acute leukemia, or a drug reaction (42).
Microscopically, the skin exhibits multiloculated,
intraepidermal vesicles; ballooning degeneration of epithelial
cells; intracytoplasmic, paranuclear, and eosinophilic viral in-
clusions (i.e., Guarnieri bodies) (Figure 13); and occasionally
FIGURE 10. Primary pneumonic tularemia — histologic
sections of lung with (A, left) neutrophilic infiltrate in alveolar
space (hematoxylin and eosin stain) and (B, right) Francisella
tularensis bacteria (immunohistochemistry)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
FIGURE 11. Tularemia — blood smear demonstrating
Francisella tularensis bacteria (Giemsa stain)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
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Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
Agents: Multiple
Viruses that can cause hemorrhagic fevers belong to differ-
ent families, including Filoviridae (Ebola, Marburg viruses),
Flaviviridae (yellow fever, dengue viruses), Bunyaviridae (Rift
Valley fever, Crimean Congo, Hantaan, Sin Nombre viruses),
and Arenaviridae (Junin, Machupo, Guanarito, Lassa viruses).
Pathologic Findings. The term viral hemorrhagic fever is
reserved for febrile illnesses associated with abnormal vascular
regulation and vascular damage. Common pathologic find-
ings at autopsy include petechial hemorrhages and ecchymoses
of skin (Figure 15), mucous membranes, and internal organs.
Although systemic hemorrhages occur in the majority of viral
hemorrhagic fevers, certain agents infect specific cells and thus
histopathologic features can differ among agents. Necrosis of
liver and lymphoid tissues, as well as diffuse alveolar damage,
occur in the majority of viral hemorrhagic fevers, but can be
more prominent for certain infections (e.g., midzonal
hepatocellular necrosis is prominent in yellow fever, but not
in dengue). Viral inclusions can be visualized in hepatocytes
with Ebola or Marburg infections by using light and elec-
tron microscopy (Figure 16) (49–54).
Diagnostic Specimens. Performing a complete autopsy with
histologic sampling of multiple organs can determine the
extent of the disease and help identify the specific virus. After
a specific etiologic agent has been isolated or identified from
an index case, targeted sampling of additional cases with similar
symptoms can decrease the exposure of autopsy personnel to
these hazardous agents and still yield diagnostic material. For
example, during outbreaks of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in
Africa, using IHC on skin punch biopsy samples was
sufficient to provide a diagnosis in a substantial number of
FIGURE 12. Smallpox — cutaneous papules and vesicles
Public Health Image Library, CDC
FIGURE 13. Smallpox — histologic section of skin with
intraepidermal vesicles and ballooning degeneration of
epithelial cells with viral inclusions (Guarnieri bodies [arrow])
(hematoxylin and eosin stain)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
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fatalities and minimized the risk to the medical personnel who
obtained the specimens (49).
Diagnostic Tests. Serum and skin samples can be tested by
using PCR, immunohistochemistry, and electron microscopy
(Figure 17). Additionally, serum can be inoculated into
experimental animals or culture cells for viral isolation.
Laboratory Response Network
CDC, in collaboration with the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL), the FBI, and other federal agencies, has
developed the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) as a
multilevel system of linked local, state, and federal public health
laboratories as well as veterinary, food, and environmental labo-
ratory partners (55–57). The primary components of LRN
are the state public health laboratories representing each of
the 50 states. Within certain states, laboratories are located in
different counties and more populated cities. In addition, fed-
eral laboratories within LRN include CDC, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infec-
tious Diseases (USAMRIID), and other Department of
Defense laboratories.
Each laboratory has been assigned a designation (Table 4),
predicated on their diagnostic capability, ranging from senti-
nel status (i.e., Level A for presumptive-level screening)
through national laboratory status (i.e., Level D for genetic
subtyping and confirmatory testing) (55–57). Hospital clini-
cal laboratories are designated as sentinel laboratories (Level A);
they have a rapid rule out and forward mission when han-
dling presumptive clinical cases. County, city, and state pub-
lic health laboratories are designated as confirmatory reference
facilities (Level B, core, or Level C, advanced), depending on
their degree of containment capacity and technical proficiency
in performing agent-specific confirmatory analyses and rapid
presumptive testing by PCR for nucleic acid amplification
and time-resolved fluorescence for antigen detection. The Level
D designation is reserved for CDC and USAMRIID labora-
tories. No regional laboratories exist; the network functions
by channeling the specimens through the designated levels to
a pathogen-specific conclusion.
ME/Cs should submit specimens from suspected biologic
terrorism-related cases to the state public health laboratory
through the local or county laboratory that serves their juris-
diction, unless their standard reporting protocol makes them
a direct client of the state laboratory. These primary laborato-
ries conduct the tests that fall within the scope of their ability
and refer specimens to the state laboratory for more advanced
tests. The state laboratory processes and refers specimens in a
similar manner to other state laboratories or CDC (Figure 18).
Contact information for all state diagnostic laboratories is in-
cluded in this report (Appendix A). The point of contact for
ME/Cs should remain the laboratory where the specimens
were first submitted, unless they are directed to contact a ref-
erence laboratory (e.g., a state laboratory) to track the progress
of the testing. Before the need for LRN services arises, ME/Cs
should establish contact with the public health laboratory serv-
ing their jurisdiction and determine how the laboratory
FIGURE 14. Intracellular mature variola virus particles grown
in cell culture*
* Note: The barbell-shaped inner core and two lateral bodies are surrounded
by an outer membrane. One brick-shaped particle is also illustrated (thin
section electron microscopy).
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
FIGURE 15. Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever — cutaneous
petechiae and ecchymoses
Reprinted courtesy of Robert Swanepoel, D.T.V.M., Ph.D.; University of
the Witwatersrand and National Institute for Virology, Sandringham,
South Africa
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services can be best accessed when needed. Such a relation-
ship might require a memorandum-of-understanding, which
should be prepared and agreed to in advance.
All specimens that are to be tested for potential biologic
terrorism pathogens are handled through the same reporting
and submission process except specimens potentially contain-
ing smallpox virus. Because smallpox virus should only be
handled in a Biosafety Level 4 facility, the specimen should be
transported to CDC (57). If ME/Cs suspect this agent, they
should notify their state public health department, which can
test for other agents that cause a vesiculopustular rash (i.e.,
varicella zoster, vaccinia, and monkeypox viruses) and either
further test or refer the specimen for rapid presumptive screen-
ing for smallpox virus by PCR. The same laboratories will be
able to coordinate submission of the specimen to CDC as
needed for pathogen confirmation. In advance, ME/Cs should
establish contact with the state health department representa-
tive who would coordinate smallpox specimen submission. In
their surveillance capacity and concurrent with specimen sub-
mission, ME/Cs should notify the epidemiologic investiga-
tion unit in their local or state health department of the
suspected smallpox-infected decedent.
Biosafety Concerns
Autopsy Risks
Biosafety is critical for autopsy personnel who might handle
human remains contaminated with biologic terrorism agents.
Tularemia, viral hemorrhagic fevers, smallpox, glanders, and
Q fever have been transmitted to persons performing autop-
sies (i.e., prosectors); certain infections have been fatal (49,58–
70). Infections can be transmitted at autopsies by percutaneous
inoculation (i.e., injury), splashes to unprotected mucosa, and
inhalation of infectious aerosols (71). All of the Category A
pathogens are potentially transmissible to autopsy personnel,
although the degree of risk varies considerably among these
organisms.
Additionally, autopsies of persons who die as the result of
terrorism-related infections might expose autopsy personnel
to residual surface contamination with infectious material. For
example, botulinum toxin has the potential to be inhaled by
autopsy personnel if it is present on the body surface at the
time of examination (72). Heavy surface contamination of
the body is unlikely because of the incubation period for the
majority of infectious agents and the likelihood that a victim
will have bathed and changed clothes after exposure and
before becoming symptomatic and dying (73). However, if
such residual material (e.g., powder) is present, examination
FIGURE 16. Ebola hemorrhagic fever — necrotic hepatocytes
with filamentous intracytoplasmic inclusions (arrows)
(hematoxylin and eosin stain)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
FIGURE 17. Ultrastructural appearance of Ebola virus
(electron microscopy negative stain)
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity, CDC
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TABLE 4. Selected characteristics and capabilities by functional level of the Laboratory Response Network for terrorism
Laboratory
level Biosafety level (BSL) Capabilities Testing Resource
D BSL-4 • Probe for universal agents CDC; U.S. Army Medical Research
• Perform all Level A–C tests Institute of Infectious Diseases
• Validate new assays
• Detect genetic recombinants
• Provide specialized reagents
• Bank isolates
• Molecular typing
• Negative stain electron microscopy for smallpox virus
C BSL-3 • Nucleic acid amplification assays Selected state public health laboratories
• Molecular typing
• Toxicity testing
• Provide surge capacity
B BSL-3Recommended or • Rule in specific agents Selected state and county public health
BSL-2 facilities with BSL-3 • Isolate and identify laboratories and other veterinary,
practices environmental, and food testing laboratories
• Forward specimens to higher level laboratories
• Process environmental samples
• Perform confirmatory testing
• Antimicrobial susceptibility testing
A BSL-2 • Rule out specific agents Clinical and other sentinel laboratories
• Early detection of presumptive cases
• Forward specimens to higher level laboratories
and specimen collection should be undertaken by using
appropriate biosafety procedures to protect autopsy and
analytic laboratory personnel from possible exposure to more
concentrated infectious material.
Because human remains infected with unidentified biologic
terrorism pathogens might arrive at autopsy without warn-
ing, basic protective measures described in this report should
be maintained for all contact with potentially infectious ma-
terials (74,75). In addition to these measures, certain high-
risk activities (e.g., use of oscillating saw) are known to increase
the potential for worker exposure
and should be performed with added
safety precautions.
Autopsy Precautions
Existing guidelines for biosafety
and infection control for patient care
are designed to prevent transmission
of infections from living patients to
care providers, or from laboratory
specimens to laboratory technicians
(76,77). Although certain biosafety
and infection-control guidelines are
applicable to the handling of human
remains, inherent differences exist in
transmission mechanisms and inten-
sity of potential exposures during
autopsies that require specific
consideration (71).
As with any contact involving broken skin or body fluids
when caring for live patients, certain precautions must be ap-
plied to all contact with human remains, regardless of known
or suspected infectivity. Even if a pathogen of concern has
been ruled out, other unsuspected agents might be present.
Thus, all human autopsies must be performed in an appro-
priate autopsy room with adequate air exchange by personnel
wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) (71).
All autopsy facilities should have written biosafety policies and
FIGURE 18. Process for submitting specimens containing suspected Category A, B, or
C* biologic agents (except smallpox virus) for testing within the Laboratory Response
Network (LRN)
Local or
l
county
aboratory
(ME/C primary
point of contact)
Medical
examiner/
coroner
(ME/C)
specimen
acquisition
State public
health laboratory
(ME/Cs report here
first if they are a
direct client of their
state laboratory
Another state
public health
laboratory
CDC
laboratory
Initial specimen
submission (dependent
upon the jurisdiction’s
LRN protocol)
* Note: Dependent upon the LRN-designated capacity (Level A, sentinel; Level B, core; Level C, advanced),
laboratory confirmation might occur on-site or require referral to the next higher-level laboratory for
confirmatory testing or correct biocontainment.
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procedures; autopsy personnel should receive training in these
policies and procedures, and the annual occurrence of train-
ing should be documented.
Standard Precautions are the combination of PPE and pro-
cedures used to reduce transmission of all pathogens from
moist body substances to personnel or patients (77). These
precautions are driven by the nature of an interaction (e.g.,
possibility of splashing or potential of soiling garments) rather
than the nature of a pathogen. In addition, transmission-based
precautions are applied for known or suspected pathogens.
Precautions include the following:
• airborne precautions — used for pathogens that remain
suspended in the air in the form of droplet nuclei and
that can transmit infection if inhaled;
• droplet precautions — used for pathogens that are trans-
mitted by large droplets traveling 3–6 feet (e.g., from
sneezes or coughs) and are no longer transmitted after
they fall to the ground; and
• contact precautions — used for pathogens that might be
transmitted by contamination of environmental surfaces
and equipment.
All autopsies involve exposure to blood, a risk of being
splashed or splattered, and a risk of percutaneous injury (71).
The propensity of postmortem procedures to cause gross soil-
ing of the immediate environment also requires use of effec-
tive containment strategies. All autopsies generate aerosols;
furthermore, postmortem procedures that require using
devices (e.g., oscillating saws) that generate fine aerosols can
create airborne particles that contain infectious pathogens not
normally transmitted by the airborne route (71,78–81).
PPE
For autopsies, Standard Precautions can be summarized as
using a surgical scrub suit, surgical cap, impervious gown or
apron with full sleeve coverage, a form of eye protection (e.g.,
goggles or face shield), shoe covers, and double surgical gloves
with an interposed layer of cut-proof synthetic mesh (71).
Surgical masks protect the nose and mouth from splashes of
body fluids (i.e., droplets >5 µm); they do not provide protec-
tion from airborne pathogens (82,83). Because of the fine
aerosols generated at autopsy, prosectors should at a mini-
mum wear N-95 respirators for all autopsies, regardless of
suspected or known pathogens (84). However, because of the
efficient generation of high concentration aerosols by mechani-
cal devices in the autopsy setting, powered air-purifying res-
pirators (PAPRs) equipped with N-95 or high-efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filters should be considered (85–87).
Autopsy personnel who cannot wear N-95 respirators because
of facial hair or other fit limitations should wear PAPRs.
Autopsy Procedures
Standard safety practices to prevent injury from sharp items
should be followed at all times (77). These include never
recapping, bending, or cutting needles, and ensuring that
appropriate puncture-resistant sharps disposal containers are
available. These containers should be placed as close as pos-
sible to where sharp items are used to minimize the distance a
sharp item is carried. Filled sharps disposal containers should
be discarded and replaced regularly and never overfilled (77).
Protective outer garments should be removed when leaving
the immediate autopsy area and discarded in appropriate laun-
dry or waste receptacles, either in an antechamber to the
autopsy suite or immediately inside the entrance if an ante-
chamber is unavailable. Handwashing is requisite upon glove
removal (77).
Engineering Strategies and Facility
Design Concerns
Air-handling systems for autopsy suites should ensure both
adequate air exchanges per hour and correct directionality and
exhaust of airflow. Autopsy suites should have a minimum of
12 air exchanges/hour and should be at a negative pressure
relative to adjacent passageways and office spaces (84). Air
should never be returned to the building interior, but should
be exhausted outdoors, away from areas of human traffic or
gathering spaces (e.g., air should be directed off the roof ) and
away from other air intake systems (88,89). For autopsies,
local airflow control (i.e., laminar flow systems) can be used
to direct aerosols away from personnel; however, this safety
feature does not eliminate the need for appropriate PPE.
Clean sinks and safety equipment should be positioned so
that they do not require unnecessary travel to reach during
routine work and are readily available in the event of an emer-
gency. Work surfaces should have integral waste-containment
and drainage features that minimize spills of body fluids and
wastewater.
Biosafety cabinets should be available for handling and
examination of smaller infectious specimens; however, the
majority of available cabinets are not designed to contain a
whole body (76,90). Oscillating saws are available with vacuum
shrouds to reduce the amount of particulate and droplet aero-
sols generated (80). These devices should be used whenever
possible to decrease the risk of dispersing aerosols that might
lead to occupationally acquired infection.
Vaccination and Postexposure Prophylaxis
Vaccines are available that convey protection against cer-
tain diseases considered to be potentially terrorism-associated,
including anthrax, plague, and tularemia (76). However, these
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vaccines are not recommended for unexposed autopsy work-
ers at low risk. Consistent application of standard safety prac-
tices should obviate the need for vaccination for B. anthracis
and Y. pestis. In 2003, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) initiated a program to administer
vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine to first responders and medical
personnel. In this context, persons who might be called on to
assess remains or specimens from patients with smallpox should
be included among this group (91) (Box 2).
The administration of prophylactic antibiotics to autopsy
workers exposed to potentially lethal bacterial pathogens is
sometimes appropriate. For example, autopsy personnel ex-
posed to Y. pestis aerosols should consider receiving such treat-
ment regardless of vaccination status (92). Similarly, because
tularemia can result from infection with a limited number of
organisms, an exposure to F. tularensis should also prompt
consideration of antimicrobial prophylaxis. However, decisions
to use antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis should be made
in consultation with infectious disease and occupational health
Because the distribution of the smallpox vaccine to
the civilian U.S. population was discontinued in 1983,†
essentially all U.S. residents having contact with a small-
pox case are at increased risk for infection. Although
probably susceptible to smallpox, with appropriate pre-
cautions, medicolegal death investigators can reduce their
risk of smallpox infection if they must examine or
autopsy a decedent suspected to be infected with small-
pox. Three risk-reduction activities during the postmor-
tem period might be considered, 1) voluntary vaccination
after the occurrence of smallpox has been confirmed in
the community; 2) modification of autopsy procedures
to limit the possible aerosolization of smallpox virus; and
3) exclusion of embalming procedures (see text).
In the event of mass fatalities resulting from a small-
pox outbreak, CDC recommends that health depart-
ments consider planning for vaccinating mortuary
personnel and their families.§ This recommendation is
relevant for medical examiners, coroners, and other
forensic death investigators who have a high likelihood
of handling smallpox-infected decedents during a mass
fatality event.
* Source: Adapted from Payne DC. Smallpox considerations for forensic
professionals. National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME)
News 2003;11(1):2.
† Source: CDC. Smallpox vaccine no longer available for civilians—
United States. MMWR 1983;32:387.
§ Source: CDC. Smallpox response plan, smallpox vaccination clinic
guide. Annex 3–38. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and
Human Services, CDC, 2002. Available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/annex-3.pdf.
¶ Source: CDC. Recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in a pre-
event vaccination program: supplemental recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the
Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee
(HICPAC). MMWR 2003;52(No. RR-7):1–16. Available at http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5207a1.htm.
**Source: CDC. Supplemental recommendations on adverse events
following smallpox vaccine in the pre-event vaccination program:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices [Notice to readers]. MMWR 2003;52:282–4. Available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5213a5.htm.
In considering vaccination plans, attention should be
given to the risk of adverse effects from smallpox vacci-
nation as well as to its potential benefits. During a
smallpox-associated mass fatality event, the federal gov-
ernment might propose that vaccinia inoculations be
offered on a voluntary basis to appropriate personnel.
Vaccinia inoculations have been effective in preventing
smallpox infection but also pose certain risks for caus-
ing adverse reactions in the vaccinee and, less frequently,
for spreading the vaccinia virus to other close contacts.
Because of the increased risk of adverse effects, the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
recommends that the following persons not receive
vaccinia inoculation:
• persons with immunosuppressive conditions;
• those receiving immunosuppressive medical treatments
or pharmaceutical regimens;
• those with eczema or who have a close contact having
eczema;
• anyone who is allergic to the vaccine or any of its
components;
• women who are breastfeeding;
• anyone aged <12 months; and
• pregnant women or women expecting to become preg-
nant within 4 weeks.¶
ACIP recommends that persons be excluded from the
pre-event smallpox vaccination program who have
known underlying heart disease, with or without symp-
toms, or who have >3 known major cardiac risk factors
(i.e., hypertension, diabetes, hypercholesterolemia, heart
disease at age 50 years in a first-degree relative, and smok-
ing).** Persons at increased risk for adverse reactions to
the vaccine should be counseled regarding the potential
risks before being vaccinated.
BOX 2. Smallpox immunization considerations for medicolegal death investigators*
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specialists, with consideration made of vaccination status,
nature of exposure, and safety and efficacy of prophylaxis.
Decontamination of Body-Surface
Contaminants
If human remains with heavy, residual surface contamina-
tion (i.e., visible) must be assessed, they should be cleansed
before being brought to the autopsy facility and after appro-
priate samples have been collected in the field. Surface clean-
ing should be performed with an appropriate cleaning solution
(e.g., 0.5% hypochlorite solution or phenolic disinfectant) used
according to manufacturer’s instructions. If the number of
remains requiring autopsy is limited (i.e., one or two), clean-
ing of heavily contaminated remains can be undertaken in an
autopsy facility that has the infrastructure, capacity, and haz-
ardous materials (HAZMAT)-trained personnel to perform
the cleaning safely. Heavily contaminated remains should not
be brought to facilities where patient care is performed. Both
personnel carrying contaminated remains and personnel
occupying areas through which remains are being carried
should wear PPE. HAZMAT personnel should perform large-
scale decontamination outdoors in a controlled setting. To
ensure mutual understanding of the roles and responsibilities
of HAZMAT and death-investigation personnel in situations
with contaminated remains, ME/Cs should develop response
protocols with HAZMAT personnel before such an event
occurs.
Waste Handling
Liquid waste (e.g., body fluids) can be flushed or washed
down ordinary sanitary drains without special procedures.
Pretreatment of liquid waste is not required and might dam-
age sewage treatment systems. If substantial volumes are
expected, the local wastewater treatment personnel should be
consulted in advance. Solid waste should be appropriately con-
tained in biohazard or sharps containers and incinerated in a
medical waste incinerator (73,75).
Storage and Disposition of Corpses
The majority of potential biologic terrorism agents
(B. anthracis, Y. pestis, or botulinum toxin) are unlikely to be
transmitted to personnel engaged in the nonautopsy handling
of a contaminated cadaver. However, such agents as the hem-
orrhagic fever viruses and smallpox virus can be transmitted
in this manner. Therefore, Standard Precautions (77) should
be followed while handling all cadavers before and after
autopsy.
When bodies are bagged at the scene of death, surface
decontamination of the corpse-containing body bags is re-
quired before transport. Bodies can be transported and stored
(refrigerated) in impermeable bags (double-bagging is prefer-
able), after wiping visible soiling on outer bag surfaces with
0.5% hypochlorite solution. Storage areas should be nega-
tively pressured with 9–12 air exchanges/hour.
The risks of occupational exposure to biologic terrorism
agents while embalming outweigh its advantages; therefore,
bodies infected with these agents should not be embalmed.
Bodies infected with such agents as Y. pestis or F. tularensis can
be directly buried without embalming. However, such agents
as B. anthracis produce spores that can be long-lasting and, in
such cases, cremation is the preferred disposition method. Simi-
larly, bodies contaminated with highly infectious agents (e.g.,
smallpox and hemorrhagic fever viruses) should be cremated
without embalming. If cremation is not an option, the body
should be properly secured in a sealed container (e.g., a Zigler
case or other hermetically sealed casket) to reduce the poten-
tial risk of pathogen transmission. However, sealed containers
still have the potential to leak or lose integrity, especially if
they are dropped or are transported to a different altitude (93).
ME/Cs should work with local emergency management
agencies, funeral directors, and the state and local health
departments to determine, in advance, the local capacity (bod-
ies per day) of existing crematoriums, and soil and water table
characteristics that might affect interment. For planning pur-
poses, a thorough cremation produces approximately 3–6
pounds of ash and fragments. ME/Cs should also work with
local emergency management agencies to identify sources and
costs of special equipment (e.g., air curtain incinerators, which
are capable of high-volume cremation) and the newer plasma
incinerators, which are faster and more efficient than previ-
ous incineration methods. The costs of such equipment and
the time required to obtain them on request should be
included in state and local terrorism preparedness plans.
ME/C’s Role in Biologic Terrorism
Surveillance
ME/Cs should be a key component of population-based
surveillance for biologic terrorism. They see fatalities among
persons who have not been examined initially by other physi-
cians, emergency departments, or hospitals. In addition, per-
sons who have been seen first by other health-care providers
might die precipitously, without a confirmed diagnosis, and
therefore fall under medicolegal jurisdiction. Autopsies are a
critical component of surveillance for fatal infectious diseases,
because they provide organism-specific diagnoses and clarify
the route of exposure (94). With biologic terrorism-related
fatalities, organisms identified in autopsy tissues can be char-
acterized by strain to assist in the process of criminal attribution.
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Models for ME surveillance for biologic terrorism mortal-
ity include sharing of daily case dockets with public health
authorities (e.g., King County, Washington, and an active
symptom-driven case acquisition and pathology syndrome-
based public health reporting system developed in New Mexico
[24]). Different areas of responsibility exist for ME/Cs regard-
ing their role in effective surveillance for possible terrorism
events. The following steps should be taken in local jurisdic-
tions to enable ME/Cs to implement biologic terrorism
surveillance:
• Death-investigation laws should be changed to enable
ME/Cs to assume jurisdiction and investigate deaths that
might constitute a public health threat, including those
threats that are probably communicable.
• Any unexplained deaths possibly involving an infectious
cause or biologic agent should be investigated to make
etiology (organism)-specific diagnoses (94).
• Uniform standards for surveillance should be used. For
example, the Med-X system developed in New Mexico
(24) uses a set of antemortem symptoms to determine
autopsy performance. The system’s syndromic approach
to postmortem diagnosis allows alerting of public health
authorities to specific constellations of autopsy findings
that could represent infectious agents before the specific
agent is identified. Diseases caused by biologic terrorism
agents are rare. To enhance surveillance for these condi-
tions, a matrix of potential pathology-based syndromes
(Table 1) has been developed to guide autopsy patholo-
gists in recognizing potential cases (24).
• Electronic information and data systems should be
designed to allow rapid recognition of excess mortality
— incorporating the ability to assess possible common-
alities among cases — and rapid communication/notifi-
cation of such information to public health authorities
who can use the information for effective response.
• Close working relationships should be developed between
ME/Cs and local or state health departments to facilitate
two-way communication that includes alerts to ME/Cs
of possible outbreaks or clusters of nonfatal infectious
diseases, which might have unrecognized fatal cases, and
appropriate reporting by ME/Cs to public health authori-
ties of notifiable disease conditions. Additionally, public
health authorities should notify ME/Cs of the epidemi-
ology of biologic terrorism-associated and other emerg-
ing infectious diseases in their community.
cdc.gov/mmwr
Chinese Proverb
"Learning is like rowing
  upstream; not to advance
  is to fall back."
Continuing
Education
MMWR Continuing Education 
provides timely courses on public 
health and clinical topics that help 
you advance your clinical skills. 
Review course descriptions, take 
exams, track results, and receive 
course certificates – all from your 
own computer, when and where 
your schedule allows.
MMWR CE
Log on. Sit ready. Advance.
Vol. 53 / RR-8 Recommendations and Reports 19
ME/C’s Role in Data Collection,
Analysis, and Dissemination
For public health surveillance, criminal justice, and admin-
istrative purposes, ME/Cs should promptly, accurately, and
thoroughly collect, document, electronically store, and have
available for analysis and reporting, case-specific death-
investigation information. Initially, depending upon local
resources and legal restrictions, all aspects of data manage-
ment and use might not need to occur in-house. Recognizing
that numerous entities use medicolegal death-investigation
data, ME/Cs should establish collaborations with public health
and law enforcement professionals to achieve the goal of com-
plete, accurate, and timely case-specific death-investigation
data. Advance planning and policy development should also
clarify to whom such data may be released and under which
circumstances. To facilitate this process, the following steps
should be taken:
• Death-investigation information should be documented
on standard forms that are consistent in content, at a
minimum, with the Investigator’s Death Investigation
Report Form (IDIRF) and Certifier’s Death Investigation
Report Form (CDIRF) (95).
• Death-investigation data should be stored in an electronic
database consistent with, at a minimum, the content out-
lined in the Medical Examiner/Coroner Death Investiga-
tion Data Set (MCDIDS) (96). These data elements
should be updated periodically.
• Electronic death-investigation data sets should include the
results of laboratory tests that are performed in the case
in question.
• Entry of data into an electronic database should be prompt
so that the database is current.
• Electronic databases should allow searching for and group-
ing of cases by disease or injury and circumstances of death.
• Electronic death-investigation data should be stored in
open, nonproprietary formats so that it can be shared as
needed.
• Death-investigation records should be stored in accordance
with state or local regulations. Ideally, these records should
be stored in perpetuity in a format that ensures future
retrieval. The format or media of electronic records might
require periodic updating.
• Mechanisms should be in place to ensure that electronic
death investigation data can be shared with public health
authorities, law enforcement agencies, and other death-
investigation agencies while providing for appropriate
confidentiality and control of the release of information
to authorized personnel or organizations only.
• ME/Cs should have specific policies that outline the
organizations and agencies that are authorized to receive
death-investigation information and the conditions in
which such information may be released.
• Policies and mechanisms should be in place to avoid
releasing death-investigation information inappropriately
and to avoid withholding information that should be avail-
able to the public.
• ME/C offices should consider establishing links with state/
local public health agencies, academic institutions, or other
health organizations to promote epidemiologic analysis
and use of their medicolegal death-investigation data in
an ongoing manner. Certain ME/C offices have deter-
mined that employing a staff epidemiologist is beneficial.
Jurisdictional, Evidentiary, and
Operational Concerns
Federal Role
On February 28, 2003, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 5 (HSPD-5) modified federal response policy (97).
Under the new directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security
is the principal federal official for domestic incident manage-
ment. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(Public Law 107-296), the Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating
federal operations within the United States to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disas-
ters, and other emergencies. The Secretary will coordinate the
federal government’s resources used in response to or recovery
from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if
and when any one of the following four conditions applies:
1) a federal department or agency acting under its own
authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; 2) the
resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and
federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate state
and local authorities; 3) more than one federal department or
agency has become substantially involved in responding to
the incident; or 4) the Secretary has been directed to assume
responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the
President.
HSPD-5 further stipulates that the U.S. Attorney General,
through the FBI, has lead federal responsibility for criminal
investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by persons
or groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens
or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the federal
criminal jurisdiction of the United States. The FBI, in
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cooperation with other federal departments and agencies en-
gaged in activities to protect national security, will also coor-
dinate the activities of the other members of the law
enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and dis-
rupt terrorist attacks against the United States. In the event of
a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat or incident,
the local FBI field office special agent in charge (SAC) will be
responsible for leading the federal criminal investigation and
law enforcement actions, acting in concert with the principal
federal officer (PFO) appointed by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security and state and local officials.
The FBI has a WMD coordinator in each of the agency’s 56
field offices (Appendix B). These persons are responsible for
pre-event planning and preparedness, as well as responding to
WMD threats or incidents. ME/Cs are encouraged to contact
their local FBI WMD coordinator before an incident to clarify
roles and responsibilities, and ME/Cs should contact the
coordinator in any case where concerns or suspicions exist of
a potential WMD-related death.
The FBI assertion of jurisdiction at the scene of a terrorist
event would not necessarily usurp (or relieve) ME/Cs from
their statutory authority and responsibility to identify dece-
dents and determine cause and manner of death. Such an
arrangement is consistent with the performance of medicole-
gal death investigation where other federal crimes are involved.
ME/Cs who conduct terrorism-associated death investigations
should be prepared to present their medicolegal death investi-
gation findings in federal court.
Public Health Agency Authority
State public health laws might establish the health
department’s specific authority to control certain aspects of
operations, personnel, or corpses in a public health emergency.
For example, the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, at the request
of CDC, has created a model state emergency health powers
act for adoption by states (98). Different states have either
enacted versions of this act or are in the process of introduc-
ing similar legislative bills (99). ME/Cs should know specifi-
cally how existing state laws might provide for the health
department to take control and dictate the disposition of hu-
man remains (burial or cremation). A state’s emergency health
powers act might also provide for
• mandatory medical examinations for ME/C personnel;
• isolation and quarantine of the public or ME/C personnel;
• vaccination against and treatment for illnesses among
ME/Cs; and
• control, use, and destruction of facilities.
ME/Cs and health departments should work together as
part of the emergency planning process to determine which
emergency health powers might be established by the health
department and under what circumstances these might be
invoked for each potential biologic terrorism agent. Deter-
mining how health departments and ME/C operations can
best interact, including documenting concerns regarding the
availability of death-investigation personnel and the control
and disposition of human remains, should be emphasized.
ME/Cs should take part in community exercises to clarify and
practice their role in the emergency response process.
General Operations
In the majority of terrorism-associated scenarios, ME/Cs
are responsible for identifying remains and determining the
cause and manner of death. To that end, ME/Cs might need
to enlist additional local, state, or federal assistance while
maintaining primary responsibility for death investigation.
ME/Cs should request this assistance from the local or state
emergency operations center (EOC), as appropriate. The prob-
able source of federal assistance is the Disaster Mortuary
Operational Response Team (DMORT). However, DMORT
has not yet developed capacity to respond to events precipi-
tated by the release of biologic agents (further details regard-
ing DMORT and other federal agencies are discussed in
following sections).
Where possible, postmortem examinations for identifying
remains and determining cause and manner of death should
occur within the local or state jurisdiction where victims have
died. Local resources dictate whether the statutory ME/C sys-
tem can accomplish this with existing personnel and within
existing facilities, or whether additional local, state, or federal
assistance is necessary. Moving substantial numbers of human
remains, particularly those contaminated by a biologic agent
(known or unknown) to locations considerably distant from
the scenes of death is neither feasible nor safe. Two potential
strategies can be used to augment the biosafety capacity of
local agencies having limited resources. One strategy would
be to develop a mobile Biosafety Level 3 autopsy laboratory.
Another strategy would be to develop regional Biosafety Level
3 autopsy centers that can handle cases from surrounding
jurisdictions or states. A combination of the two approaches
will probably achieve the best coverage of national needs.
Postmortem Examinations and
Evidence Collection
A large-scale biologic event might create more fatalities than
combined local, state, and federal agencies can store and
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examine (15). Small or rural jurisdictions might be over-
whelmed by a relatively limited number of fatalities, whereas
larger state or city ME/C offices could conceivably process
greater numbers of human remains. No formulas exist that
can be used to determine in advance the autopsy rate and the
extent of autopsy that might be needed. In the event of a bio-
logic event, ME/Cs should perform complete autopsies on as
many cases as feasible on the basis of case volume and biosafety
risks. These autopsies should meet the standards that forensic
pathologists usually meet for homicide cases. Conferring with
the FBI and appropriate prosecutorial authorities early in the
process will ensure that appropriate documentary and diag-
nostic maneuvers are employed that will support the criminal
justice process. Similarly, interacting with public health
authorities early in the death-investigation process should
ensure that appropriate diagnostic evaluations are conducted
to support the public health investigation and response.
After the etiologic agent has been determined, certain (or
all) other potentially related fatalities can be selectively sampled
to confirm the presence of the organism in question. ME/Cs
should coordinate the decision to transition from complete
autopsies to more limited examinations with law enforcement
and public health professionals. Selective sampling could
include skin swabs and needle aspiration of blood or other
body fluids, tissues for culture, or biopsies of a particular tis-
sue or organ for histologic diagnostic tests (e.g., immunohis-
tochemical procedures and electron microscopy). The required
specimens from a limited autopsy and the diagnostic proce-
dures employed will be dictated by the nature of the biologic
agent. Guidelines for targeted organs or tissues for culture or
analysis were discussed previously. As with all homicides, chain-
of-custody for specimens should be maintained at all times.
Whenever a complete autopsy is performed, the goals should
be to 1) establish the disease process and the etiologic agent;
2) determine that the agent or disease is indeed the cause of
death; and 3) reasonably rule out competing causes of death.
When limited autopsies or external examinations are
performed, ME/C personnel should
• identify the deceased;
• document the appearance of the body;
• establish that the presenting clinical symptoms and signs
are consistent with the alleged etiologic agent;
• confirm the presence of the etiologic agent in the body;
• state with reasonable probability that the alleged agent
was the underlying cause of death (e.g., inhalational an-
thrax infection); and
• state with reasonable probability the likely immediate
cause of death (e.g., pneumonia, meningitis, or medias-
tinitis).
Forming a reasonably sound medical opinion regarding cause
and manner of death can be accomplished with knowledge of
the presenting syndrome and circumstantial events, external
examination of the body, and testing of appropriate speci-
mens to document the etiologic agent. For example, in a con-
firmed smallpox outbreak, identifying the deceased, externally
examining the body and photographing the lesions, and
obtaining samples from the lesions for culture or electron
microscopy might be adequate.
Biologic evidence obtained at autopsy can be sent to local
or state health department laboratories, and other physical
evidence can be sent to the usual crime laboratory, unless oth-
erwise instructed by the FBI. Laboratories within LRN, as
described previously, are responsible for coordinating the trans-
fer of evidence or results to the FBI, U.S. Attorney General,
or local and state legal authorities, as appropriate. Consistent
with routine practice, ME/Cs should document all evidence
transfers adequately.
Cause and Manner of Death
Statements
Death certificates are not withheld from the public record,
even when the cause of death is terrorism-related. The cause
of death section should be used to fully explain the sequence
of the cause of death (e.g., “hemorrhagic mediastinitis due to
inhalational anthrax”). If death resulted from a terrorism event,
the manner of death should be classified as homicide. The
“how injury occurred” section on the death certificate should
be completed, and it should reflect how the infectious agent
was delivered to the victim (e.g., “victim of terrorism; inhaled
anthrax spores delivered in mail envelope”). The place of
injury should be the statement of where (i.e., geographic
location) the agent was received.
Reimbursement for Expenses and
Potential Funding Sources
Additional funding for ME/Cs might be needed for either
preparedness or use during an actual biologic terrorism event.
ME/Cs should prepare financially for potential future terror-
ist events that might be similar to the anthrax attacks of
October–November 2001. In crisis situations, funding is
retroactive but no less a concern.
Preparedness funding can support multiple activities,
including training of ME/Cs for large-scale terrorism events.
Certain activities involving training of ME/Cs have occurred
through DMORT, a program authorized by the DHHS
Office of Emergency Preparedness to rapidly mobilize ME/Cs
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§ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended
by Public Law 106-390, October 30, 2000, United States Code, Title 42,
The Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 68, Disaster Relief.
to respond to incidents of mass fatality. Preparedness funding
can also support surveillance activities in ME/C offices. As
part of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response coopera-
tive agreements with state health departments, CDC has pro-
vided funding to New Mexico and other states that are
pursuing ME/C surveillance systems as an enhancement to
their traditional surveillance systems. The New Mexico
Office of the Medical Investigator has been a recipient of this
funding through the New Mexico Department of Health since
the inception of the cooperative agreement program. This
funding has supported development of specialized surveillance
techniques for deaths caused by potential agents of biologic
terrorism (24) and recognition of ME/Cs as a key resource for
all phases — early detection, case characterization, incident
response and recovery — of a public health emergency
response. CDC encourages pursuit of this enhanced (ME/C)
surveillance capacity through cooperative agreements with
states, if the state has made adequate progress with other
critical capacity goals.
ME/Cs might obtain preparedness funding by integrating
their response activities into the existing EOCs that have been
established at selected state and county levels (integration of
ME/C offices into this framework is discussed in Communi-
cations and the Incident Command System). When ME/C
offices are integrated into the emergency response system,
ME/Cs have an opportunity to make emergency management
officials aware of ME/C emergency responsibilities and
resource needs.
The sources of funding for consequence management,
including medicolegal death investigation, will depend on the
scope of the terrorism event. In events with a limited number
of deaths, funding for activities related to the detection and
diagnosis might remain at the office level. Because terrorism
deaths are homicides, these deaths will contribute to an office’s
jurisdictional workload, and future planning for preparedness
funding should be considered. Certain ME/C offices are
already a part of the local or state public health department or
are already affiliated with an EOC. ME/C offices, health
departments, and EOCs are strongly encouraged to forge links
for effective preparedness and response and to participate in
joint training exercises to maximize preparedness funding.
In events with multiple deaths, a federal emergency might
be declared. As long as ME/Cs’ offices are officially working
through the state or local EOC, certain expenses associated
with the response (e.g., cost of diagnostic testing) can be sub-
mitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) for reimbursement. In the majority of localities, these
requests for resources required for appropriate response dur-
ing an event should be submitted through local emergency
management agencies that are part of state and local EOCs.
Costs will probably be covered by the agency that has
jurisdiction over the disaster (e.g., FEMA). In cases where a
presidential disaster declaration is made, testing costs, victim
identification, mortuary services, and those services that are
covered by the National Disaster Medical System (a mutual
aid network that includes DHHS, the Department of Defense,
and FEMA) (100) are reimbursable under Emergency Sup-
port Function 8 (Health and Medical) of the Federal Response
Plan (FRP).
Under FRP, FEMA covers 75% of reimbursement costs; the
remaining 25% are covered by the state through emergency
funds or in-kind reimbursement. FEMA also supports state
emergency funds through the DHHS electronic payments
management system. In an emergency, all requests for reim-
bursement flow from their point of origin, in this case from
an ME/C, through the state EOC/emergency management
agency, to FEMA.§ Before an event, ME/Cs should clarify
the procedures to follow to ensure that they will be reimbursed
for expenses incurred as part of their emergency response.
DMORT
DMORT is a national program that includes volunteers,
divided into 10 regional teams responsible for supporting death
investigation and mortuary services in federal emergency
response situations involving natural disasters and mass fa-
talities associated with transportation accidents or terrorism.
Team members are specialists from multiple forensic disci-
plines, funeral directors, law enforcement agents, and admin-
istrative support personnel. Each team represents a FEMA
region. DMORT members are activated through DHS after
mass fatalities or events involving multiple displaced human
remains (e.g., a cemetery washout after a flood).
The primary functions of DMORT include the identifica-
tion of human remains, evidence recovery from the bodies,
recovery of human remains from the scene, and assisting with
operation of a family assistance center. Whenever possible,
identification of the bodies is made by using commonly
accepted scientific methods (e.g., fingerprint, dental, radio-
graph, or DNA comparisons).
Upon activation, DMORT members are federal government
employees. When DMORT is activated, representatives from
DHS are also sent to manage the logistics of deployment. The
FBI most commonly staffs the fingerprint section of the
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¶ State requests should be directed to the Department of Homeland Security,
National Disaster Medical System Section, by telephone at 301-443-1167
(or 800-USA-NDMS) or by fax at 301-443-5146 (or 800-USA-KWIK).
morgue. The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory
in Rockville, Maryland, has traditionally performed DNA
analyses; the arrangements for this testing are negotiated sepa-
rately with the local ME/C.
After a request for DMORT assistance has been made, one
of two Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMUs) and
DMORT staff are sent to the disaster site. DPMUs contain
specialized equipment and supplies, prestaged for deployment
within hours to a disaster site. DPMUs include all of the equip-
ment required for a functional basic morgue with designated
workstations and prepackaged equipment and supplies.
DPMUs can operate at Biosafety Level 2, but do not have the
ventilatory capacity necessary to protect prosectors and other
nearby persons from airborne pathogens. DPMUs also con-
tain equipment for site search and recovery, pathology,
anthropology, radiology, photography, and information
resources, as well as office equipment, wheeled examination
tables, water heaters, plumbing equipment, electrical distri-
bution equipment, personal protective gear, and temporary
partitions and supports. DPMUs do not have the materials
required to support microbiologic sampling. When a DPMU
is deployed, members of the DPMU team (i.e., a subset of
DMORT) are sent to the destination to unload the DPMU
equipment and establish and maintain the temporary morgue.
Additional equipment is required locally after DMORT acti-
vation. At a minimum, this equipment includes a facility in
which to house the morgue equipment, a forklift to move the
DPMU equipment into the temporary morgue facility, and
refrigerated trucks to hold human remains.
ME/Cs can request DMORT response after a mass fatality
or after an incident resulting in the displacement of a sub-
stantial number of human remains. ME/Cs should follow state
protocols for DMORT requests. Typically, ME/Cs contact
the state governor’s office, which then requests DMORT from
DHS.¶ The request should include an estimate of how many
deaths occurred (if known), the condition of the bodies (if
known), and the location of the incident. When deployed,
DMORT supports ME/Cs in the jurisdiction where the inci-
dent occurred. All medicolegal death investigation records
created by DMORT are given to ME/Cs at the end of the
deployment, and ME/Cs are ultimately responsible for all of
the identifications made and the documents created pertaining
to the incident.
DMORT-WMD Team
The DMORT-WMD team is composed of national rather
than regional volunteers. The primary focus of DMORT-
WMD is decontamination of bodies when death results from
exposure to chemicals or radiation. DMORT-WMD is devel-
oping resources to respond to a mass disaster resulting from
biologic agents. However, this team might have difficulty in
responding to such an event if the deaths occur in multiple
locations.
The major forensic disciplines (i.e., forensic dentistry,
forensic anthropology, and forensic pathology) as well as
funeral directors, law enforcement, criminalists, and admin-
istrative support persons are represented on the DMORT-
WMD team. Members of DMORT-WMD undergo
specialized training that focuses on chemical and radiologic
decontamination of human remains. The DMORT-WMD
unit has separate equipment, stored separately from the
DPMU, including PPE (up to and including level A suits),
decontamination tents, and equipment to gather contaminated
water. DMORT-WMD teams are requested and deployed in
the same manner as general DMORTs.
Communications and the Incident
Command System
ME/Cs are key members of the biologic terrorism detec-
tion and management response team in any community and
should be integrated into the comprehensive communication
plan during any terrorism-associated event. Routine and con-
sistent communication among ME/Cs and local and state labo-
ratories, public health departments, EOCs, communication
centers, DMORT, and other agencies, is critical to the success
of efficient and effective biologic terrorism surveillance, fatal-
ity management, and public health and criminal investiga-
tions. Planning for different emergency scenarios and
participation in disaster response exercises are necessary to
ensure effective response to a terrorism event.
Each state and certain counties have some type of emer-
gency operation center that has been organized to provide a
coordinated response during a terrorism event. ME/Cs should
verify their jurisdiction’s EOC contact point and work with
them periodically regarding concerns related to preparedness
and response.
All EOCs follow the Incident Command System (ICS)
(100), an internationally recognized emergency management
system that provides a coordinated response across organiza-
tions and jurisdictions. The ICS structure allows for individual
EOC decision making and different information flow in each
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state. ME/Cs should determine how the EOC functions in
their jurisdiction.
Each ICS is composed of a managing authority that directs
the response of health department, law enforcement, and
emergency management officials during a planning exercise,
emergency, or major disaster. In addition to assessing the inci-
dent and serving as the interagency contact, ICS also coordi-
nates the response to information inquiries and the safety
monitoring of assigned response personnel. The ICS organi-
zational framework, includes planning, operations, logistics,
and finance/administration sections (101). ME/Cs are most
likely to participate in the operations team, which makes tac-
tical decisions regarding the incident response and implements
those activities defined in action plans. This team might also
include public health, emergency communications, fire, law
enforcement, EMS, and state emergency management agency
staff.
During a suspected terrorism event, ME/Cs should be
responsible for the following actions to facilitate communica-
tion:
• Promptly inform laboratory, public health, and law
enforcement personnel of findings of investigations of sus-
pected biologic terrorism-related deaths as well as per-
sonnel needs and new developments. To expedite
information exchange, ME/Cs should familiarize them-
selves with the appropriate contact persons and agencies
for response in their jurisdictions.
• Answer the EOCs’ requests to collect and report data in a
timely manner.
• Coordinate communication of their activities with the
state emergency management agency and EOCs for their
jurisdiction to avoid release of confidential or speculative
information directly to the public or media (102).
Conclusion
ME/Cs are essential public health partners for terrorism
preparedness and response. Despite state and local differences
in medicolegal death-investigation systems, these investiga-
tors have the statutory authority to investigate deaths that are
sudden, suspicious, violent, and unattended, and consequently
play a vital role in terrorism surveillance and response. Public
health officials should work with ME/Cs to ensure that these
investigators can assist with surveillance for infectious disease
deaths possibly caused by terrorism and provide confirmatory
diagnoses and evidence in deaths linked to terrorism. This
process should involve an assessment of local ME/C standards
for accepting jurisdiction of potential infectious disease deaths
and performing autopsies, laboratory capacity for making
organism-specific diagnoses, and autopsy biosafety capacity.
Ideally, ME/Cs should
• perform complete autopsies with histologic sampling of
multiple organs in deaths potentially caused by biologic
terrorism agents, given the constraints of case volume and
biosafety concerns;
• have access to routine microbiologic testing for organism-
specific diagnoses in potential infectious disease deaths;
• ensure protection from both airborne and bloodborne
pathogens for all occupants of the autopsy facility
(Biosafety Level 3);
• participate in a standardized ME/C surveillance model
for infectious disease mortality (e.g., Med-X); and
• document death investigative information on standard
forms that are stored in an searchable electronic format
and that can be shared with public health authorities.
If biologic terrorism-related fatalities occur, ME/Cs are
responsible for identifying remains and determining the cause
and manner of death. Routine and consistent communica-
tion among ME/Cs and local and state laboratories, public
health departments, EOCs, law enforcement, and other agen-
cies is critical to the success of efficient and effective biologic
terrorism surveillance, fatality management, and public health
and criminal investigations. To prepare for this possibility,
ME/Cs should
• contact their local FBI WMD coordinator to clarify roles
and responsibilities;
• understand how local public health laws might impact
ME/C function;
• become familiar with the capacity of local or state EOCs,
ICS, and the process for submitting response-associated
expenses for federal reimbursement;
• be aware of the process for submitting biologic and physi-
cal evidence in potential biologic terrorism-related fatali-
ties;
• understand the procedure for writing cause and manner
of death statements in terrorism-related fatalities; and
• identify appropriate health department officials for the
reporting of notifiable or suspicious infectious diseases or
potential biologic terrorism-related deaths.
The majority of ME/C facilities do not have the capacity to
perform autopsies at Biosafety Level 3 as a consequence of
facility design features that are expensive to fix. In addition,
DMORT does not have the capacity to respond to events pre-
cipitated by the release of biologic agents. These limitations
might affect local, state, and national surveillance for infec-
tious disease deaths of public health importance, including
those deaths potentially caused by terrorism. Two potential
strategies might be used in the future to augment the biosafety
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capacity of local agencies having limited resources. One strat-
egy would be to develop a mobile Biosafety Level 3 autopsy
laboratory. Another strategy might be to develop regional
Biosafety Level 3 autopsy centers that can handle cases from
surrounding jurisdictions or states. A combination of the two
approaches will probably achieve the best coverage of national
needs.
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Alabama
Bureau of Clinical Laboratories
State Department of Public Health
8140 University Drive
Montgomery, AL 36130-3017
Phone: 334-260-3400
Fax: 334-244-5083
Alaska
Alaska Department of Health and Social Services
Division of Public Health Laboratory
4500 Boniface Parkway
Anchorage, AK 99507
Phone: 907-334-2100
Fax: 907-334-2161
American Samoan
Department of Health Services
Government of American Samoa
LBJ Tropical Medical Center
Pago Pago, AS 96799
Phone: 684-633-4606
Fax: 684-633-5379
Arizona
Bureau of State Laboratory Services
Arizona Department of Health Services
1520 West Adams Street
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Phone: 602-542-0357
Fax: 602-542-0760
Arkansas
Arkansas Department of Health
4815 West Markham Street
Little Rock, AR 72205
Phone: 501-661-2191
Fax: 501-661-2310
California
California State Department of Health Service
2151 Berkeley Way, Room 703
Berkeley, CA 94704
Phone: 510-540-2408
Fax: 510-540-3075
Colorado
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment
P.O. Box 17123
Denver, CO 80217
Phone: 303-692-3096
Fax: 303-692-3008
Connecticut
Division of Laboratories
Connecticut Department of Public Health
P.O. Box 1689
10 Clinton Street
Hartford, CT 06144
Phone: 860-509-8500
Fax: 860-509-8697
Delaware
Delaware Public Health Laboratory
P.O. Box 1047
Smyrna, DE 19977-1047
Phone: 302-653-2870
Fax: 302-653-2877
District of Columbia
Department of Health—Public Health Laboratory
300 Indiana Avenue, NW
Suite 6154
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-727-8956
Fax: 202-724-1455
Appendix A
Contact Information for State Public Health Laboratory Response Network
(September 2002)
Contact information and laboratory specimen-collection systems are subject to change. Before sending specimens to a state
laboratory, this information should be verified. Contact the Association of Public Health Laboratories by telephone at 202-822-
5227 or by Internet at http://www.aphl.org/Public_Health_Labs/index.cfm.
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Florida
Department of Health
Bureau of Laboratories
P.O. Box 210
Jacksonville, FL 32331-0042
Phone: 904-791-1550
Fax: 904-791-1567
Georgia
Georgia Public Health Laboratory
Department of Human Resources
1749 Clifton Road
Decatur, GA 30033-4050
Phone: 404-327-7900
Fax: 404-327-7919
Guam
Inactive (as of 11/09/01)
Department of Public Health and Social Services
P.O. Box 2816
Agana, GU 96910
Phone: 671-735-7102
Fax: 671-734-5910
Hawaii
Laboratory Division
State of Hawaii Department of Health
2725 Wiamano Home Road, 3rd Floor
Pearl City, HI 96782
Phone: 808-453-6652
Fax: 808-453-6662
Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare
2220 Old Penitentiary Road
Boise, ID 83712
Phone: 208-334-2235
Fax: 208-334-2382
Illinois
Illinois Department of Public Health
825 North Rutledge Street
P.O. Box 19435
Springfield, IL 62794-9435
Phone: 217-782-6562
Fax: 217-524-7924
Indiana
Indiana State Department of Health
635 North Barnhill Drive
Indianapolis, IN 46202
Phone: 317-233-8006
Fax: 317-233-8003
Iowa
University Hygienic Laboratory
University of Iowa
H 101 Oakdale Hall
Iowa City, IA 52242
Phone: 319-335-4500
Fax: 319-335-4600
Kansas
Division of Health and Environmental Laboratories
Kansas Department of Health and Environment
Forbes Building, No. 740
Topeka, KS 66620
Phone: 785-296-1619
Fax: 785-296-1641
Kentucky
Department for Public Health
100 Sower Boulevard
Frankfort, KY 40601
Phone: 502-564-4446
Fax: 502-564-7019
Louisiana
State Office Building, Central Laboratory
325 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70112
Phone: 504-568-5375
Fax: 504-568-5393
Maine
Department of Human Services
221 State Street, Station 12
Augusta, ME 04333
Phone: 207-287-2727
Fax: 207-287-6832
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Maryland
State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
P.O. Box 2355
Baltimore, MD 21203
Phone: 410-767-6100
Fax: 410-333-5403
Massachusetts
State Laboratory Institute
305 South Street
Boston, MA 02130
Phone: 617-983-6201
Fax: 617-983-6927
Michigan
Michigan Department of Community Health
2250 North MLK Boulevard, Building 44
Lansing, MI 48909
Phone: 517-335-8063
Fax: 517-335-9631
Minnesota
Minnesota Department of Health
717 Delaware Street, SE
Minneapolis, MN 55440
Phone: 612-676-5331
Fax: 612-676-5514
Mississippi
State Public Health Laboratory
Mississippi Department of Health
570 East Woodrow Wilson Drive
Jackson, MS 39215-1700
Phone: 601-576-7582
Fax: 601-576-7720
Missouri
State Public Health Laboratory
Missouri Department of Health
P.O. Box 570
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Phone: 573-751-3334
Fax: 573-751-7219
Montana
Public Health Laboratory
P.O. Box 6489
Helena, MT 59601
Phone: 406-444-3444
Fax: 406-444-1802
Nebraska
Public Health Laboratory
University of Nebraska Medical Center
600 42nd Street
Omaha, NE 68198
Phone: 402-559-4116
Fax: 402-559-4077
Nevada
Nevada State Laboratory
University of Nevada School of Medicine
1660 North Virginia Street
Reno, NV 89503-1738
Phone: 775-688-1335
Fax: 775-688-1460
New Hampshire
Office of Community and Public Health
6 Hazen Drive
Concord, NH 03301
Phone: 603-271-4657
Fax: 603-271-4783
New Jersey
Public Health Laboratories
John Fitch Plaza, 4th Floor, P.O. Box 361
Trenton, NJ 08625-0361
Phone: 609-292-7783
Fax: 609-292-9285
New Mexico
New Mexico Department of Health
Scientific Laboratory Division
P.O. Box 4700
Albuquerque, NM 87196-4700
Phone: 505-841-2500
Fax: 505-841-2543
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New York
Wadsworth Center
New York State Department of Health
P.O. Box 509
Albany, NY 12201
Phone: 518-474-7592
Fax: 518-474-3439
North Carolina
State Laboratory of Public Health
P.O. Box 28047
Raleigh, NC 27611-8047
Phone: 919-715-5874
Fax: 919-733-8695
North Dakota
Division of Microbiology
North Dakota Department of Health
P.O. Box 5520
Bismarck, ND 58506
Phone: 701-328-5262
Fax: 701-328-5270
Northern Mariana Islands
Inactive (as of 11/09/01)
Department of Public Health
Commonwealth Health Center
P.O. Box 409 CL
Saipan, MP 96950
Phone: 670-234-8950
Fax: 670-234-8930
Ohio
State Department of Health
P.O. Box 2568
Columbus, OH 43216
Phone: 614-644-4590
Fax: 614-752-9863
Oklahoma
Public Health Laboratory Services
State Department of Health
P.O. Box 24106
Oklahoma City, OK 73214
Phone: 405-271-5070
Fax: 405-271-4850
Oregon
Oregon Health Division
Center for Public Health Laboratories
P.O. Box 275
Portland, OR 97207
Phone: 503-229-5296
Fax: 503-229-5682
Pennsylvania
Bureau of Laboratories
Pennsylvania Department of Health
P.O. Box 500
Exton, PA 19341-0500
Phone: 610-280-3464
Fax: 610-594-9972
Puerto Rico
Institute of Health Laboratory
Department of Health
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Building A — Call Box 70184
San Juan, PR 00936-8184
Phone: 787-274-7817
Rhode Island
Rhode Island Department of Health
50 Orms Street
Providence, RI 02904-2283
Phone: 401-222-5554
Fax: 401-222-3332
South Carolina
Harold Dowda, PhD
Director, Bureau of Laboratories
Department of Health & Environmental Control
P.O. Box 2202
Columbia, SC 29202
Phone: 803-896-0800
Fax: 803-896-0983
South Dakota
Michael Smith
Laboratory Director
615 East Fourth Street
Pierre, SD 57501
Phone: 605-773-4757
Fax: 605-773-6129
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Tennessee
Tennessee Department of Health
630 Hart Lane
Nashville, TN 37247
Phone: 615-262-6300
Fax: 615-262-6393
Texas
Texas Department of Health
110 West 49th Street
Austin, TX 78756
Phone: 512-458-7318, ext. 2418
Fax: 512-458-7221
Utah
Division of Epidemiology and Laboratory Services
46 North Medical Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84113-1105
Phone: 801-584-8450
Fax: 801-584-8486
Vermont
Vermont Department of Health
108 Cherry Street
P.O. Box 70
Burlington, VT 05420-0070
Phone: 802-863-7246
Fax: 802-865-7701
Virgin Islands
Inactive (as of 11/09/01)
Roy L. Schneider Hospital
P.O. Box 7309
Charlotte Amalie, VI 00801
Phone: 340-776-8311
Fax: 340-714-6314
Virginia
Division of Consolidation Laboratory Services
Commonwealth of Virginia
One North 14th Street, Room 231
Richmond, VA 23219
Phone: 804-786-7905
Fax: 804-371-7973
Washington
Washington State Department of Health
Public Health Laboratories
1610 NE 150th Street
P.O. Box 550501
Shoreline, WA 98155-9701
Phone: 206-361-2885
Fax: 206-361-2904
West Virginia
Office of Laboratory Services
State of West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources
167 11th Avenue
South Charleston, WV 25303-1137
Phone: 304-558-3530
Fax: 304-558-2006
Wisconsin
State Laboratory of Hygiene
William D. Stovall Building
465 Henry Mall
Madison, WI 53706
Phone: 608-262-3911
Fax: 608-262-3257
Wyoming
Wyoming Public Health Laboratory
517 Hathaway Building
Cheyenne, WY 82002
Phone: 307-777-6066
Fax: 307-777-6422
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Alabama
Birmingham
205-326-6166
Mobile
334-438-3674
Alaska
Anchorage
907-258-5322
Arizona
Phoenix
602-279-5511
Arkansas
Little Rock
501-221-9100
California
Los Angeles
310-477-6565
Sacramento
916-481-9110
San Francisco
4l5-553-7400
Colorado
Denver
303-629-7171
Connecticut
New Haven
203-777-6311
Delaware
Baltimore, MD
410-265-8080
Florida
Jacksonville
904-721-1211
Miami
305-944-9101
Tampa
813-273-4566
Georgia
Atlanta
404-679-9000
Hawaii
Honolulu
808-521-1411
Idaho
Salt Lake City, UT
801-579-1400
Illinois
Chicago
312-431-1333
Springfield
217-522-9675
Indiana
Indianapolis
317-639-3301
Iowa
Omaha, NE
402-493-8688
Kansas
Kansas City, MO
816-221-6100
Kentucky
Louisville
502-583-3941
Louisiana
New Orleans
504-816-3000
Appendix B
Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Office Telephone Numbers
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Maine
Boston, MA
617-742-5533
Maryland
Baltimore
410-265-8080
Massachusetts
Boston
617-742-5533
Michigan
Detroit
313-965-2323
Minnesota
Minneapolis
612-376-3200
Mississippi
Jackson
601-948-5000
Missouri
Kansas City
816-221-6100
St. Louis
314-231-4324
Montana
Salt Lake City, UT
801-579-1400
Nebraska
Omaha
402-493-8688
Nevada
Las Vegas
702-385-1281
New Hampshire
Boston, MA
617-742-5533
New Jersey
Newark
973-792-3000
Philadelphia, PA
215-418-4000
New Mexico
Albuquerque
505-224-2000
New York
Albany
518-465-7551
Buffalo
716-856-7800
New York City
212-384-1000
North Carolina
Charlotte
704-377-9200
North Dakota
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Terms and Abbreviations Used in This Report
APHL Association of Public Health Laboratories
CDIRF Certifier’s Death Investigation Report Form
DFA direct fluorescent assays
DHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team
DPMU Disaster Portable Morgue Unit
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EOC emergency operations center
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRP Federal Response Plan
H&E hematoxylin and eosin
HAZMAT Hazardous materials
HEPA high-efficiency particulate air
HSPD 5 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
ICS Incident Command System
IDIRF Investigator’s Death Investigation Report Form
IHC immunohistochemical
LRN Laboratory Response Network
MCDIDS Medical Examiner/Coroner Death Investigation Data Set
ME/Cs medical examiners and coroners
NAME National Association of Medical Examiners
NDMS National Disaster Medical System
PAPRs powered air-purifying respirators
PCR polymerase chain reaction
PFO principal federal officer
PPE personal protective equipment
SAC special agent in charge
USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
WMD weapons of mass destruction
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1. Infectious disease mortality surveillance systems should be designed
to do all of the following except . . .
A. allow for rapid recognition of excess mortality occurring in a
community.
B. delay information transfer until the official death certificate has been
submitted to the state health department.
C. quickly notify public health authorities of potential biologic terrorism-
related or emerging pathogens findings.
D. incorporate the ability to assess possible commonalities among cases.
2. Which of the following is a disease caused by a Category A agent of
terrorism?
A. Brucellosis.
B. Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome.
C. Tularemia.
D. Venezuelan encephalitis virus infection.
E. Cholera.
3. LRN . . .
A. is not relevant to biologic terrorism surveillance.
B. channels specimens through a network of local, state, and federal
public health laboratories to a pathogen-specific conclusion.
C. are four regional laboratories named, A, B, C, and D.
D. performs routine toxicology tests for ME/C offices.
4. Which of the following activities potentially pose an infectious disease
risk to ME/Cs?
A. Generation of fine particle aerosols through use of oscillating saws and
other autopsy equipment.
B. Exposure to blood.
C. Contact with the contaminated surfaces of body bags.
D. All of the above.
E. None of the above.
5. Methods to improve surveillance and standardized collection of data
include . . .
A. documenting death investigation information on standard forms.
B. storing death investigation data in an electronic database.
C. including the results of laboratory tests in electronic death
investigation data sets.
D. correctly entering data into an electronic database.
E. all of the above.
6. The Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) has
the capacity to . . .
A. protect forensic professionals from airborne pathogens by using state-
of-the-art ventilators.
B. support microbiologic sampling for Class A and B biologic terrorism
agents.
C. respond to a mass disaster resulting from biological agents.
D. store and archive all medicolegal death investigation records created
during a mass fatality incident.
E. none of above.
F. all of above.
Goal and Objectives
This MMWR provides recommendations regarding how medicolegal investigators (i.e., medical examiners and coroners [ME/Cs]) can support public health and
safety functions and provide terrorism surveillance and response efforts. These recommendations were developed by CDC staff in collaboration with the National
Association of Medical Examiners (NAME). The goal of this report is to describe terrorism-related mortality surveillance and response, operational procedures during
a potential terrorism event, and jurisdictional and evidentiary concerns for medicolegal death investigations. Upon completion of this educational activity, the reader
should be able to 1) describe the responsibilities of ME/Cs in recognizing and responding to potential terrorism events; 2) list specific terrorism agents; 3) describe
biosafety standards for autopsy precautions; 4) identify appropriate interjurisdictional support services; and 5) describe the Laboratory Response Network (LRN).
To receive continuing education credit, please answer all of the following questions.
7. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
and the Federal Response Plan . . .
A. requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to
reimburse 90% of expenses incurred by an ME/C office for death
investigations resulting from a terrorism event.
B. highlights the responsibilities of specific federal agencies during a
terrorism event.
C. designates consequence management to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation during a terrorism event.
D. None of the above.
E. All of the above.
8. The Incident Command System defines functional teams of an
emergency response organization as all of the following except . . .
A. planning and intelligence.
B. operations.
C. logistics.
D. finance and administration.
E. public health surveillance.
9. Hemorrhagic mediastinal lymphadenitis and hemorrhagic meningitis
(or cardinal’s cap) are two pathologic findings consistent with . . .
A. cholera.
B. community-acquired pneumonia.
C. Nipah virus infection.
D. anthrax.
E. botulism.
10. The risk of occupational exposure to Class A terrorism agents while
embalming outweigh its advantages; therefore, bodies infected with
these agents should not be embalmed.
A. True.
B. False.
11. Which best describes your professional activities?
A. Medical examiner or coroner.
B. Physician.
C. Nurse.
D. Health educator.
E. Office staff.
F. Other.
12. I plan to use these recommendations as the basis for . . .  (Indicate all
that apply.)
A. health education materials.
B. insurance reimbursement policies.
C. local practice guidelines.
D. public policy.
E. other.
Vol. 53 / No. RR-8 Recommendations and Reports CE-3
Detach or photocopy.
M
M
W
R
 R
e
sp
o
n
se
 F
o
rm
 f
o
r 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
in
g
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 C
re
d
it
Ju
n
e
 1
1
, 
2
0
0
4
/V
o
l.
 5
3
/N
o
. 
R
R
-8
M
ed
ic
a
l E
xa
m
in
er
s,
 C
o
ro
n
er
s,
 a
n
d
 B
io
lo
g
ic
 T
er
ro
ri
sm
 A
 G
u
id
eb
o
o
k
 f
o
r 
Su
rv
ei
lla
n
ce
 a
n
d
 C
a
se
 M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
13. Each month, approximately how many autopsies do you perform?
A. None.
B. 1–5.
C. 6–20.
D. 21–50.
E. 51–100.
F. >100.
14. How much time did you spend reading this report and completing the
exam?
A. <2.0 hours.
B. >2.0 hours but <3.0 hours.
C. >3.0 hours but <4.0.
D. >4.0 hours.
15. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe the
responsibilities of ME/Cs in recognizing and responding to potential
terrorism events.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
16. After reading this report, I am confident I can list specific terrorism
agents.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
17. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe biosafety
standards for autopsy precautions.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
18. After reading this report, I am confident I can identify appropriate
interjurisdictional support services and resources.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
19. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe the Laboratory
Response Network.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
20. The objectives are relevant to the goal of this report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
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Correct answers for questions 1–10.
1. B; 2. C; 3. B; 4. D; 5. E; 6. E; 7. B; 8. E; 9. D; 10. A.
21. The teaching strategies used in this report (text, figures, boxes, and
tables) were useful.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
22. Overall, the presentation of the report enhanced my ability to
understand the material.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
23. These recommendations will affect my practice.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
24. The content of this activity was appropriate for my educational needs.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
25. The availability of continuing education credit influenced my
decision to read this report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
26. How did you learn about this continuing education activity?
A. Internet.
B. Advertisement (e.g., fact sheet, MMWR cover, newsletter, or journal).
C. Coworker/supervisor.
D. Conference presentation.
E. MMWR subscription.
F. Other.
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